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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A STUDY ON KOREAN PENINSULA PEACEFUL 
UNIFICATION PROCESS 
 
By 
 
Ali-Piri 
 
This monograph examines the question of what scenario would be more 
applicable for the Korea Peninsula unification process? Today North Korea appears to be 
on the verge of disintegration due in large part to philosophy of Juche or self-reliance, the 
disastrous flooding of 1995 resulting in widespread famine, and disproportionate military 
spending at the expense of economic development and social welfare.   
In this regard Four scenarios are advanced; Soft landing and Hard landing. First scenario, 
Collapse and absorption, Second, Unification through conflict, Third, Potential external 
intervention, and Forth, Kim Jong Il remains in power but recognizes that his power is 
too weak and that can no longer effectively govern. In this case he will seeks 
reunification accordance with the South Korea’s long term reunification.      
The soft landing scenarios result in gradual reunification in accordance with South 
Korea’s three-phase reunification plan. The hard landing scenarios cause tremendous 
suffering, increased instability, and require intervention in order to stabilize the peninsula 
and prevent spillover both to the North and South as well as massive migration of the 
North’s population. Because of current North Korea’s situations, its hard to say that hard 
landing scenario would occur. It seems that North Korea is now facing three options; 
status quo, fundamental reform and limited reform. According to the first option, 
Pyongyang regime values most highly its own survival and that fears that any meaningful 
reforms would have the same fatal consequences for itself as reforms had for the former 
socialist nations in Eastern Europe. It thus envisions a continuation of North Korea’s 
socialist system as the regime muddles through its economic problems, while maintaining 
its confrontational policy toward South Korea. In the status quo option, it is inevitable 
that the North Korean economy will continue to deteriorate. This option is also contrary 
to the interest of not only the U.S. and its allies, but also china. But the Pyongyang 
regime may at least maintain political stability, owing to its all-encompassing system of 
control, and voice against regime and exit from the country will be kept at minimum 
levels. This option may be acceptable for the short term, but its long- term prospect for 
the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime appears to be very gloomy.       
 The second option the North Korea may take is fundamental reform (political, social and 
economic) in an attempt to reserve the economic decline. Since politics takes precedence 
over economic in North, political and social reforms are essential for effective economic 
reform. In this option North Korea could improve its economic conditions considerably 
and lesson its economic and diplomatic isolation. Tensions in the Korean peninsula could 
be significantly reduced. The international community, including South Korea would 
welcome and support North Korea’s reform policy. But when North Korea loosens its 
social and political control and opens up the society, nationwide protests and violence 
and massive southward migration are likely to occur. Facing the unprecedented 
challenges of exploding voice and massive exit, the Pyongyang regime could become 
very fragile. Because of political risks, the North Korean leadership will be reluctant to 
adopt a strategy of fundamental reform and full openness. If the North Korean regime is 
able to overcome short-term social and political instability and prevent massive exit, it 
may succeed in achieving a soft landing. Such a development may lead the two Koreas to 
peaceful coexistence and a gradual process of unification in the long term.           
According to the third option in order not only to improve economic conditions but also 
to minimize political risks, North Korea may have to adopt a reform program entailing 
very limited opening and liberalization. This would likely take the form of some 
economic reform, but very little social and political reform. Every reform policy would 
be administered under strict party control. In this option North Korean government could 
slow down its economic deterioration while minimizing political risks, at least for a while. 
With a flexible foreign policy, the government could alleviate its diplomatic isolation and 
extract more foreign assistance. The international community would grudgingly accept 
Pyongyang’s policy of limited reform.  
From North Korea’s stand point , the status quo option must seem politically desirable 
but economically undesirable. The fundamental reform option is undesirable because it is 
politically dangerous. Therefore, it should prefer the limited reform strategy, because it 
can improve its economy without losing control over the country. For the short term, such 
a strategy appears to be reasonable for Pyongyang, but it is unlikely to lead to a soft 
landing in the long term. 
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I-Introduction 
With the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of East-West confrontation, new 
challenges demand political management in order that the emergence of new 
aggravations and tensions be avoided. Divided countries such as Yemen, Germany and 
Korea were the epitome of the cold war era with its acute ideological division. Yemen 
and Germany achieved unification in 1990; Korea is still waiting. The Korean peninsula, 
for one, is still mired in a Conflict, which reflects the harsh ideological divide, uneven 
economic development and the built-up of menacing military forces, including nuclear 
capabilities. 
In this dissertation my puzzle question is what will happen for future Korean peninsula 
unification? 
Although some scenarios such as integration and peaceful unification, collapse and 
absorption, unification through conflict, and finally potential external intervention are 
predicted for Korean peninsula unification. But my hypothesis in this paper is south and 
north Koreas will unified through first aforement ioned scenarios. In this regard I’m going 
to discuss through causal theory and approve it by some evidence.       
Today North Korea’s situation is worsening. It has mired in a systematic economic crisis; 
flood- driven food crisis, Hard currency shortages and system failures. It should reform 
their economic system successfully before the current crisis causes total collapse, and 
now has launched its own reforms. But its reform in a variant with the so- called East 
Asian growth model, has focused an open door policy without much import liberalization 
and partial domestic liberalization limited to the consumer sector.    
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Although the basic directions of such a model are understandable, the intensity of the 
reform measures is not radical and strong enough in North Korea , and the economy has 
exhausted domestic resources to rely on in her research for solution and is having 
difficulty in getting access to external resources.  
The dilemma which North Korea leadership is facing now, is that they want to do 
something to deal with the situation but do not want it to lead into a regime collapse as 
happened in the former Soviet Union. Preservation of the regime is the top priority of the 
Kim Jung- il leadership, and at the same time, they want to keep their socialist identity to 
a certain extent. 
However, depending on the success or failure of the North Korea open door policy, some 
scenarios such as “Soft landing” and “Hard landing” are possible; 
First, according to an optimistic “Soft landing” scenario, the open door policy leads to 
economic success via help from the US and South Korea, which will bring in subsequent 
international cooperation. This will be followed by radical domestic reforms, which will 
set the ground for a peaceful economic integration with South Korea. During the course 
of this scenario, however, if the success were obtained without much South Korean help, 
it could lead North Korean leadership to take a somewhat hostile position toward South 
Korea, and then progress of North and South unification will be  slow or continuing 
division will prevail. 
Second, according to a pessimistic “hard landing” or soft crash scenario, the open door 
policy end up a failure with no international help. In this case, the current crisis will have 
deepened in to a collapse, which will bring in political leadership change internally or 
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have South Korean take over. In either case, simultaneous and radical reform of domestic 
system and external economic relations initiated by either new North Korean leadership 
or South Koreans will be a natural course. In this case, reforms will proceed 
simultaneously with rapid economic integration with South Korea, and the German big 
bang will be relevant in this transition.    
Third, a sudden internal coup is also predicted. This scenario can be considered as a 
variant of the above- mentioned hard landing scenario in that it will also lead to a radical 
reform and open door policy. 
I believe that a better and less costly option is to move along the soft landing scenario 
with a view to hasten unification. The general international perception has been that the 
cost of the hard landing scenario taking place and the uncertainties that will emerge from 
it are too big for the concerned neighboring countries to pay for. Although given the ever 
worsening situation in North Korea has grown up concern that it’s too late to expect the 
soft landing scenario to realize, and we are running out of time to implement the soft 
landing, but this does not mean that the sudden collapse is the best. I believe that 
hastening unification is beneficial for every country involved, but it does not necessarily 
mean to go along the hard landing scenario.     
It should be mention that soft landing scenario does not mean “ act slowly”, we should to 
act as quickly as possible. at this conjuncture, what should we do is to act quickly to 
improve the situation in North Korea by taking unilateral initiatives and to urge North 
Korean to opt for more radical policies. The soft landing scenario is based on the 
judgment that we still have time to try this option. It is still worthwhile to attempt it since 
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a soft landing is less costly for every country concerned, including both Koreas. 
International coordination and effort, especially South Korea’s initiatives, should be 
taken to move things on this track rather than just watching North Korea die. 
On the other hand, as is now clear, an important element in the soft landing scenario is a 
more radical reform package from the North Korean part, including de facto privatization 
of agricultural production system and more encouragement of non-state and market-
oriented activities in consumer goods as well as border trade with China and Russia. 
Then the question is whether we can expect the current leadership take such policy lines. 
The ever-aggravating situation, on one hand, pushes for such option, however on the 
other hand, it has been recently leading to the hard- liners including the military taking 
more power inside the top leadership. Given that North Korea’s military leaders can be 
assumed to be even more narrow- minded that the Pyongyang norm, such changes lead 
one to be skeptical about the possible policy changes. 
The question of the nature of the North Korean leadership is thus a very critical element 
in the future of North Korea, especially in the soft landing scenario. A big assumption in 
the soft landing scenario is that a success with open door policy will lead to further 
reform of domestic economic system with “reform dividends” materializing as a political 
force supporting more reform. If the leadership intervene in this process to check such 
tendency, an emerging pattern would be a typical stop-go type reform cycle, as have been 
observed in the past reform waves in the former East European planned economies in the 
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previous decades and currently in Romania and Cuba. This type of “muddling through” 
can be considered as a fourth scenario or a variant of the first soft landing scenario1.      
Why unification is so necessary for Korean peninsula? 
Today, the world has entered the age of unlimited competition centered around 
economics instead of ideology. Therefore, the economy of a country is closely related 
with those of other countries to make the whole earth a village bound into one 
community with a strong trend of globalization due to the demands for mutual 
interdependence and complementarily among nations.  
At present, the Korean Peninsula is under bad conditions in terms of international 
competition for survival due to various restraints and the yoke of an ideological conflict 
caused by the division of the country. Yet a unified Korea will surely be able to win a 
victory over coldhearted survival competition in the international community and seek 
greater progress.  
 What should be the blueprint for a unified Korean Peninsula? 
Politically, "the dignity of an individual human being" will be the highest value of human 
society, all rights regarding the right of vote, suffrage, right to choose a government, etc. 
will be ensured, and a free democracy will take a firm root on the basis of a market 
economy system ensuring free economic activities, thereby assuring national prosperity 
and development as well as the happiness of all citizens.  
For the same reasons, the south Korean government made it clear, in explaining the 
vision of a unified Korea within the context of the, national community unification 
formula, that Korea will become an advanced democratic nation, where all 70 million 
                                                               
1 Keun Lee, “ Between Collapse and Survival in North Korea : An Economic Assessment of the Dilemma”, 
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citizens become the masters of the country and every individual's freedom, welfare and 
human dignity are ensured."  
Economically, Korea will grow into a world economic power, playing an important role 
in the economic bloc of Northeast Asia. Supported by such economic potentialities, the 
revitalization of the North Korean economy, which has recorded consecutive minus 
growth since 1990, will be possible.2 
 With upgraded economic power, the people's living standards and the quality of life will 
be drastically improved, finally to construct a welfare state.  
Many futurologists and economists predict that the Pacific-rim regio ns and the Northeast 
Asian region will become the economic center of the world in the 21st century. 
Therefore, it is easy to say that a unified Korea will become a country at the economic 
center in the Asia-Pacific era, on the basis of the geographical benefits the Korean 
Peninsula enjoys in Northeast Asia as well as its high level of science and technology.  
Culturally, Korea will become a culturally advanced nation by generalizing and 
disseminating its traditional Korean culture to a world level. In a unified Korea, the 
recovery of national identity, which has been divided into the South and the North, will 
be attained soon so as to achieve a reorientation and development of a unified national 
culture.  
Internationally, on the other hand, with the removal of the conditions of confrontation 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Division of the Economics Seoul National University -draft paper, Seoul, 1997, pp25-26.  
2 - The most serious economic problem facing the DPRK by the mid -1990s was simply producing enough 
food to adequately feed its people. Both natural and man- made factors contributed to the food crisis, 
including natural soil depletion, the inability to important fertilizer owing to a lack of foreign exchange, a 
deteriorating distribution infrastructure, and reduction of food imports from the former socialist bloc. Even 
before the 1995 floods, North Korea had requested food assistance from a number of countries.  
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ world Food Program, special Alert No. 
267, May 13, 1996, p. 2.     
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threatening peace in the Northeast Asian area, a foothold for prosperity and the 
development of Northeast Asia will be constructed. In addition, after the unification of 
Korea, the linkage of traffic in Northeast Asia, which has been severed thus far, will be 
reinstated so that the economic competitiveness of Northeast Asian countries will be 
naturally enhanced.  
In other words, a unified Korea will become the axis of traffic to link China in the north, 
Russia in the northeast, Japan and the United States in the southeast, and Southeast Asia 
and Oceania in the south, thereby contributing to the regional development of Northeast 
Asia and acting as a veritable central nation in the Asia-Pacific era.  
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II-Korean peninsula historic process of division 
As with Germany, the division of Korea was caused by the rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The Yi Dynasty3 was the last kingdom in 
Korea before Korea was occupied by Japanese forces in 1905 and annexed by Japan in 
1910. The surrender of the Japanese troops in August 1945 was received separately by 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and Korea became divided at the 38th parallel 
into two military occupation zones, with the Soviet forces in the north and the American 
forces in the South. At the Moscow conference in December 1945, the US and the USSR 
agreed to a four-power trusteeship to last five years.4 However, the Soviet Union refused 
to take concrete measures to carry out the agreement. 
The US presented the question of Korean independence before the United Nations 
General Assembly, which adopted a favorable resolution on November 14, 1947, 
establishing a nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK). 
The UNTCOK arrived in Seoul but was refused admission to North Korea by the Soviet 
Commander. Elections were held in South Korea in May 1948 and the Republic of Korea 
was inaugurated on August 15.5 
In the North, a Provisional People's Committee, led by Kim II Sung of the Korea 
Communist Party, was established in February 1946. In July, the North Korean Worker's 
                                                               
3- The Yi dynasty, which Yi Song-gye established in 1392, lasted until 1910. Yi Song- gye became known 
by his posthumous title of T’ae-jo of the new dynasty. Korea was renamed Choson or the land of Morning 
Calm and Seoul was build as a capital of Korea.  
Source: Andrew C. Nahm,“ A panorama of 5000 years - Korean history” second revised Edition, 1989.       
P. 50. 
4- Weiqun GU, “Conflicts of Divided Nations – The case of China and Korea” USA library of Congress 
ISBN, 1995 , p. 160 
5- B.K.Gills, “Korea versus Korea- A case of contested legitimacy” new York ,1996, P.42 
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Party was formed from the merger of Kim's Communist Party and the New People's Party 
led by Koreans returning from Yenan. In 1947, a Supreme People's Assembly was 
established and Kim II Sung became premier. A new assembly was elected in August 
1948 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed on 
September 9, 1948. Soviet forces withdrew from North Korea in December 1948. The 
Workers' Parties of North and South Korea were merged into one party, the Korean 
Workers' Party in June 1949 with headquarters in Pyongyang.  
On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops invaded the Republic of Korea. In the absence of 
the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council called for a cessation of hostilities 
and for military assistance from all members to South Korea. After 25 months of war and 
negotiation, an armistice was signed on June 27, 1953, along a demilitarized zone, which 
passes around the 38th parallel. This armistice continues today.  
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III-History of Reconciliation process between south and North Korea 
Official peaceful contacts between South and North Korea began in the early 1970's. The 
Nixon Doctrine of 1970 signaled the lessening of the Cold War and the advent of détente 
in the international system and the Korean Peninsula. On August 12, 1971, the president 
of the South Korean National Red Cross proposed direct South-North negotiations to 
arrange for the reunion of family members separated by the division of the country. His 
proposal was accepted by the president of the Red Cross of North Korea. North Korea 
sought peaceful coexistence with the West and proposed a North-South Korean dialogue. 
On July 4, 1972, a joint communiqué was published simultaneously by Seoul and 
Pyongyang agreeing that unification should be peaceful and through independent Korean 
efforts not subject to external imposition or interference and that it should transcend 
differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems; a South-North coordinating committee was 
established.6 
South Korea has been a permanent observer at the United Nations since 1951, and North 
Korea obtained observer status in 1973. South Korea President Park Chung Hee 
announced on June 23, 1973 that South Korea would not object to entering the United 
Nation together with North Korea, provided that this would not hinder national 
unification. President Park made it clear that this policy was to be considered as an 
interim measure before national unification and did not signify recognition of North 
Korea as a state. The South Korean government preferred a gradual approach to a unified 
state. 
                                                               
6- Young whan Kihl, “politics and policies in Divided Korea: regime in Contest”, 1984,p. 55. 
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North Korea put forward a five-point "Peaceful Unification Program" in response to the 
June 23 statement, proposing joint entrance into the United Nations under the single 
name of "Confederal Republic of Koryo" along with the creation of a great national 
assembly. North Korea argued that the concurrent admission to the United Nations would 
lead to the permanent division of the country and preferred a rapid step to unification. 
Unification talks were suspended in 1973 and a series of clashes between North and 
South Korean vessels occurred in disputed waters in 1974. In October 1978 the United 
Nations Command accused North Korea of threatening the 1953 armistice after 
discovering an underground tunnel beneath the demilitarized zone. 
In the 1980s, some international changes promoted cooperation between South and North 
Korea. The emergence of Gorbachev in the USSR weakened the Cold War system; North 
Korea needed to improve its relations with the United States. It therefore suggested 
tripartite talks on unification in June 1984, involving North and South Korea and the 
United States. The offer meant a significant change in the North Korean position as it 
included South Korea for the first time. The North Korean proposal was rejected by 
South Korea, which favored direct bilateral talks between South and North Korea. 
After the explosion of a South Korean airplane over Southeast Asia in Nove mber 1987 
with the loss of many lives, South Korea accused North Korea of sabotage; North Korea 
denied the accusation but indicated that unless North and South Korea resolved their 
differences, a military confrontation was likely and so proposed a joint conference. In 
August 1988 a series of talks were held at Panmunjom between North and South Korean 
legislators. The negotiations produced no constructive results. From 1988 to 1992 
government representatives of two Koreas met at least 160 times.70 meeting related to  
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the high level talks, 25 to the nuclear issue, and 23 to sports exchanges, and at least 18 
meeting of Red Cross representatives were convened to discuss visits of separated family  
members 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV-Negotiating the national unification disputes of Korea 
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The dramatic end of Cold war era presented a new occasion for resuming inter- Korean 
dialogue and negotiation. As in other divided states, the new international environment of 
post-cold war era changed some of the attitudes involved in the Korean division. South 
and North Korea agreed to build a new relationship through their Prime ministers' 
meetings in the early 1990s. In September 1990, North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Muk 
visited Seoul for discussions with South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young-Hoon. The 
meeting represented the highest-level contact between North and South Korea for the first 
time since the end of the Korean War. Subsequent talks between the two premiers were 
held in October and December 1990 and, after a hostile delay, a year later in October, 
1991.8 
An agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation between 
South and North Korea was signed at the conclusion of the fifth round of prime 
ministerial talks in Seoul in December. Under the agreement, South and North Korea 
pledged to discontinue mutual slander, to promote economic cooperation and reunion of 
family members and to work toward a full peace treaty to replace the 1953 armistice 
agreement. The agreement became effective in February 1992 during the sixth round of 
negotiations, held in Pyongyang, when the two parties accepted each other for the first 
time as legitimate partners in negotiation.  
South and North Korea realized that peace and unification are inter-related and that 
peaceful coexistence between the two parties must precede the national unification. The 
Basic Agreement provided a framework for cooperation and exchanges between South 
and North Korea to build a foundation for the unification. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Togil paekso “unification white paper 1995” Seoul, national unification Board, 1995, p.183. 
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North Korea applied for UN membership in May 1991, in a change from its earlier 
insistence that the two Koreas should occupy a single UN seat. Both Koreas became 
members of the UN separately in September 1991. 
Despite the 1991 Basic Agreement, North and South Korea face important political issues, 
which complicate the stakes involved in unification. These issues are the nuclear issue of 
North Korea and the transformation of the Korean Armistice Regime. 
North Korea officially joined the IAEA in September 1974. It joined the NPT in 
December 1985 and signed the nuclear safeguard agreement with the IAEA in January 
1992. The North Korean Supreme People's Assembly ratified the agreement in April 
1992. Meanwhile, the Bush (former U.S. president) Administration declared it would 
withdraw nuclear weapons from South Korea in September 1991. The prime ministers of 
South and North Korea signed a Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula on January 20, 1992, designed to eliminate the danger of nuclear war through 
the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to create an environment and conditions 
for peaceful unification of Korea.9 
 According to the declaration, South and North Korea shall not test, manufacture, produce, 
receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and nuclear reprocessing and 
uranium enrichment facilities, and shall use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. 
In order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the parties agreed to 
conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side and agreed upon between the  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
8- Young Whan Kihl, “ the politics of inter Korean Relations: Co- existence or Reunification?” 1994,p. 133. 
9- Andrew Mack, “ The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula”, Asian survey, 1993 vol. XXXIII, pp. 339-
40. 
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Two sides in accordance with the procedures and methods to be determined by the South-
North Joint Nuclear Control Commission. After the ratification of the nuclear safeguard 
agreement of North Korea, the first international inspection team arrived at its nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon. The inspection team found evidence of North Korea's non-
compliance with its NPT obligations. Eventually, the confrontation between North Korea 
and the IAEA came to a deadlock, leading to North Korean decision to pull out of the 
NPT altogether in March 1993. At this point, the US felt compelled to open a direct 
dialogue with North Korea on nuclear matters. 
The first result was a statement in June 1993 in Geneva, which suspended the North 
Korean withdrawal from the NPT. In return, the US pledged not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against North Korea. 
After subsequent negotiations which benefited from a roadblock-breaking intervention by 
former President Jimmy Carter, the US and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework 
on the Nuclear Issue in Geneva on October 21, 1994.10 
With this agreement, North Korea promised to dismantle its potential military application 
of the nuclear program. In accordance with this nuclear agreement, North Korea froze its 
nuclear program on November 1, 1994, and pledged to dismantle its graphite-moderated 
reactors by 1998.  
A North Korean submarine landed on the eastern coast of South Korea in September 
1996 and 26-armed infiltrators came ashore. Later, North Korea apologized to South 
Korea for the incident and promised to make efforts to ensure that such an incident will 
not recur. The apology opened the way to a resumed dialogue between North and South 
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Korea and contributed to the reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The next day, 
North Korea agreed to talk with South Korea and the United States about negotiating a 
formal end to the Korean War. North Korea also agreed at the same time, December 30, 
1996, to store spent nuclear fuel rods safely rather than reprocessing them for plutonium 
in keeping with a 1994 agreement. North Korea and an US-led consortium called the 
Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO) signed the protocols on January 8, 
1997 for the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors. KEDO was formed in 1995 
after the 1994 US-North Korean agreement to freeze its suspected nuclear weapons 
program in exchange for the two light-water reactors. The first round of DPRK-KEDO 
talks took place from 11 to 12 September 1995 in Kuala Lumpur.11 
In return for the nuclear agreement, North Korea gained economic, political, and military 
benefits. Economically, North Korea exchanged the nuclear freeze for US $ 4.5 billion 
worth of economic assistance, the Western pledge to transfer some advanced 
technologies to North Korea, a ten-year supply of oil, and an easing of economic 
sanctions.12 As in the case of Germany but several steps away from unification, stakes 
were redefined and the formula for agreement became "removal of obstacle in exchange 
for payment." Politically, the nuclear deal with the US allowed North Korea to break out 
of international isolation, including the improvement of its relations with major Western 
Countries and the application for membership in international organizations such as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10- B.K.Gills, “Korea versus Korea- A case of contested legitimacy” New York,1996, P. 245. 
11- The people’s Korea, paper, 7 October 1995.  
12- The formula adopted by the Geneva Agreement Framework between the US and DPRK of October 21, 
1994. According to this agreement North Korea will be given two light water reactors by the 2004 and 
50,000 tons of heavy oil in1995 and 500,000 tons annually thereafter as compensation for its project energy 
losses under the agreement. In exchange North Korea has agreed to freeze and terminate, in due course, its 
nuclear facilities subject to verification by the IAEA. It has also agreed that 8,000 fuel rods separated from 
the spent fuel and removed from the 5- megawatt reactor at Yongbyon will be stored and eventually 
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IMF, World Bank, APEC, WTO, etc. Militarily, North Korea obtained the US guarantee 
that the US would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, as 
long as North Korea remained in the NPT. 
Despite the l994 accord, however, North Korea was suspected of developing nuclear 
weapons at the Kumchangri underground site near Yangbyon. The US had been pressing 
since August l998 for access to the site. The Clinton Administration was obliged by the 
US Congress to clear up all suspicions by the end of the following May; if not, Congress 
was set to suspend the use of federal funds to supply North Korea with heavy oil as an 
alternative energy source, thus damaging the l994 Agreed Framework. 
In a major breakthrough, North Korea agreed on l6 March l999 to provide the US 
satisfactory access to the Kumchangri site by allowing an initial visit by a US delegation 
in May l999 and additional visits later on to remove any concern about the site's future 
use. The US in turn agree to take steps to improve political and economic relations, and 
also offered 600,000 tons of grain to North Korea through the World Food Program. 
In relation to the nuclear issue, North Korea missile development has raised tensions in 
the peninsula and more broadly in the region. Since l985, North Korea has been 
conducting missile tests, including the Scud B in l985, Scud C in l990, and Rodong I in 
l993. The US held negotiations with North Korea since l996 in order to freeze the North 
Koran ballistic missile program and halt the export of its missiles to countries in the 
Middle East and South Asia. In August l998, North Korea test fired a newly developed 
Taepodong I ballistic missile into the open seas off the coast of Japan; it also developed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
shipped out of the country.  Source: David R.McCann, “ Korea Briefing Toward Reunification” USA 
library of Congress ISSN, 1997, p. 60       
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Taepodong II, capable of reaching the West Coast of the US. The Taepodong I missile 
test was intended as a show of force by North Korea in its dealings with the US.  
During his visit to North Korea in May l999, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
Perry, appointed by President Clinton to prepare a report on US policy toward North 
Korea, offered economic and political incentives in return for an end to missile 
development. In August, North Korea expressed its willingness to negotiate over its 
missile development. There is a possibility that North Korea has undertaken its missile 
program as a bargaining chip, in order to trade it off against economic and political 
benefits being considered by the US, although the foreign missile sales are economically 
rewarding. If the benefits offered are sufficient, North Korea in difficult economic straits 
may have no alternative but to accept the deal offered by the US. 
The transformation of the Korean armistice regime into a peace treaty is seen as the way 
to change the stakes from security between hostile neighbors to joint security and 
prosperity through unification. The 1953 armistice has come under serious threat as 
North Korea has raised its demand for United States-North Korean peace treaty. Since 
1974, North Korea has been proposing negotiations with the US to replace the Armistice 
Agreement with a peace treaty.13 
Until recently, South Korea held the position that issues related to replacing the current 
armistice regime with a new peace structure were to be discussed through a dialogue 
between South and North Korea. South Korea wants to be actively involved in the 
resolution of the armistice issue. At a summit meeting between President Clinton and 
South Korean former President Kim Yong-Sam in April, 1996, the two leaders proposed 
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the convening of a four-party meeting of the representatives of South and North Korea, 
the United States and China "as soon as possible and without preconditions" to "initiate a 
process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement." They agreed that this process 
should also address a wide range of tension-reduction measures.  
The Chinese initial response to the proposal was positive, saying that it was willing to 
play a constructive role as a signatory to the Armistice Agreement. However, as time 
went on, China made it clear that the four-party talk can only be realized when the parties 
directly concerned, South and North Korea, settle their differences. China would not 
press North Korea to accept the proposal. The South Korea-US Joint Announcement also 
made it clear that the two Koreas should take the lead in a renewed search for a 
permanent peace agreement and that ""separate negotiations between the US and North 
Korea on peace-related issues on the Korean Peninsula cannot be considered".  
The two rounds of preliminary talks in New York failed to produce agreement on the 
agenda for negotiations at the four-party talks. In the first round in August 1997, the 
United States and South Korea insisted that North Korea should join the talks 
unconditionally. North Korea demanded massive food aid, a lifting of economic 
sanctions and formal relations with the US as preconditions for the talks. The second 
round in September also failed to produce any results as North Korea continued to 
demand food aid as a prerequisite for entering four-party talks and insisted that the issue 
of US troop withdrawal from South Korea should be included on the agenda. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13- Kim Han Gil, “Modern History of Korea” 1979, p. 529. 
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V - Four party talks and Kim Dae Jung’s sun shine policy 
The four party talks, which include the United States and China as well as the two Koreas, 
appeared to be an innovative way to engage China with the United States in a joint 
endeavor that could benefit Korea. While helping the two Koreas to accelerate their 
dialogue and establish a peace process, the United States and China also could use this 
venue as a mechanism of US-PRC policy consultations. At least on the surface, the 
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United States and China’s roles in the inter- Korean peace process appear constructive, 
almost being, even though American- Chinese relations are complex in both history and 
politics.14      
The first round of 4-party talks was held in Geneva in December 1997. The meeting 
discussed the future direction of 4-party talks, but could not produce any agreement, even 
on the composition of committees. Even without any results, the first round was 
significant in that the four-party talks actually came into operation. The four parties 
agreed to hold the second meeting in March 1998.  
While the first two rounds of talks focussed mainly on how to proceed, the third round in 
October l998 produced an agreement to set up two subcommittees on the establishment 
of a peace regime in the Korean peninsula and on tension reduction there. The subsequent 
meetings of the subcommittees began to handle substantive, concrete issues, but the sixth  
Round in August l999 ground to an impasse on the same old issues. North Korea insisted 
that the agenda include its demand for US troop withdrawal from South Korea and a 
peace treaty between North Korea and the US. 
South Korean policy favors a gradual approach to unification: first, confidence-building 
and peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, and later, nation unification. South 
Korean President Kim Dae-jung suggested a sunshine policy toward North Korea, asking 
North Korea to open its door to South Korea and the outside world and indicating that 
South Korea would not seek to absorb the North. 
                                                               
14- Edward A. Olsen, “US. & China: Conflicting Korean Agendas” Korea and world Affairs, vol. XXI, 
No.2, summer 1997, p. 256. 
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He recites three principles and three stages. The principles are peaceful coexistence, 
peaceful exchange and peaceful unification. The three stages are (1) a confederation of 
states, (2) then a federation “like the USA” and (3) complete unification. In this large 
context, he has examined and taken positions on issues such as a peace agreement, arms 
control, arms reduction, military confidence building measures, verification, international 
guarantees and multilateral security arrangements in the region.15 
 But the response was very defensive. North Korea said that it would pursue its own 
policy of opening the door in its own way to the outside world and criticized South 
Korea's attempt to liberalize the North through its sunshine policy. North Korea's main 
concern at this stage is to maintain its own political system amidst the changes occurring 
in the rest of the former Communist area, especially Eastern Europe. North Korea used 
nuclear and missile threats to obtain aid from the United States and other countries in 
order to overcome its tremendous economic difficulties. Experiencing it own economic 
difficulties at the end of the l990s, South Korea has also worried about maintaining its 
system. Both South and North Korea seek to maintain the status quo. However, both 
Koreas need a more stable international environment to maintain their systems. Thus both 
may need to establish a peace regime in the peninsula. 
The four-party meeting can be utilized as an opportunity to enhance the peace and 
stability and facilitate unification of the Korean Peninsula. But on the question of 
transforming the current Korean armistice regime into a peace regime, 
                                                               
15- Kim Kyung-Won & Han Sung-Joo, “ Managing Change on the Korean peninsula” South Korea Seoul 
press, 1998, p. 157. 
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South and North Korea differ as to the tactical issues such as the parties to the negotiation 
and the role of the current armistice regime. South Korea has maintained that the 
transformation of the armistice regime should be discussed between the two parties 
concerned, as stated in the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, 
Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea. 
North Korea insists that a peace treaty should be negotiated between North Korea and the 
US, excluding South Korea. The Armistice Agreement was signed by the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers, on the one hand, and the UN Commander, on the other; since the Chinese 
People's Volunteers have withdrawn from Korea and the UN forces in South Korea are in 
fact US troops, the real parties to the Armistice Agreement are the DPRK and the US and 
these would be the parties to conclude a peace treaty, according to North Korea. Since 
South Korea did not sign the armistice agreement, it cannot become a signatory to the 
peace treaty. Thus, South and North Korea differ as to who should negotiate on the 
transformation of the armistice agreement regime into a peace regime. 
North Korea has tried to nullify the Armistice Agreement since 1994. It has taken a series 
of unilateral means to undermine the current armistice regime. It has paralyzed the 
Military Armistice Commission (MAC) by withdrawing its own delegation and pressing 
China to recall its delegation from the Commission, and has closed down the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) by expelling its Polish members from North 
Korea. Also, the North Korean infiltration of armed agents aboard a submarine in 1996 
flagrantly violated the Korean armistice agreement. 
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The four-party meeting was motivated to harmonize the US-North Korean talks and the 
inter-Korean dialogue. The US was in a dilemma to meet North Korea's demand for 
direct talks and simultaneously to allay South Korean concerns. The four-party meeting 
proposal was presented as a practical solution to the dilemma. As North Korea continues 
its pro-US / anti-South Korean policy approach, the meeting is a supplementary device to 
encourage North Korea to restart the South-North Korean dialogue on the establishment 
of a peace arrangement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI- South Korea Unification Formula: Confederation Formula  
1. Background and History  
In September 1989, Republic of Korea put forward its official unification formula called 
national community unification formula in which the two Koreas create a unified country 
after a stage of confederation.  This formula proposes the three- stage unification process 
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of reconciliation and cooperation, a North-South confederation, and the unified state. 
This framework means a voluntary unification process on the part of both Koreas, based 
on active dialogue, and the roles of the neighboring countries are to concentrate upon 
assistance in the stage of reconciliation and cooperation.16       
This formula is based on a recognition that immediate reunification of the two Koreas, 
integration of their diplomatic and military rights and consolidated management of their 
internal affairs are impossible due to their sharply different systems.  
The national community unification formula as mentioned comprised of 3 stages 
(reconciliation and cooperation, inter-Korean confederation and ultimate unification) is 
deeply rooted in free democracy that is the best way to ensure humane life of individuals 
and achieve human values. The gist of the reunification formula consists of autonomy, 
peace and democracy, which are principles consistently espoused by the South Korean 
government.  
The existing government of the people has been seeking to institutionalize the inter-
Korean confederation initiative by pursuing peace, rapprochement and cooperation, 
keeping the national community unification formula intact.  
2. Concept  
The unification formula is intended to initiate and expedite reunification procedures by 
creating a partnership between the two governments, maintaining the existing two 
systems and two governments on the peninsula.  
                                                               
16- Weon sik Kang ,“KINU Research Abstracts 97”,Korean institute for national unification, Seoul,1998, 
P.18  
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In other words, the key points of the formula include peaceful management of the divided 
Korean peninsula (war prevention, tension reduction and disarmament), development of 
reunification-oriented cooperative relations (confidence building and co-prosperity) and 
promotion of inter-Korean integration (improvement of a standoff and creation of a 
cooperation and reunification system).  
3. Confederation Mechanism  
To institutionalize cooperative relations between the two governments, it is proposed to 
organize a consultative body including an inter-Korean summit, cabinet meeting, and 
joint committee by area and combined legislative conference.  
4. Role of the Inter-Korean Confederation  
At the stage of confederation, the two Koreas are to take the following preparatory steps 
for unification based on mutual consultation.  
- Preparation for political integration: political confidence building through reconciliation 
and cooperation  
- Preparation for economic integration: creation and development of a nat ional economic 
community through economic cooperation  
- Preparation for people's unity: recovery of national homogeneity through social and 
cultural exchanges  
- Preparation for military integration: disarmament based on military confidence building  
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- Preparation for institutional consolidation: improvement of laws injurious to unification 
and preparation for establishment of a unification constitution  
- Guarantee of international cooperation: creation of an international environment 
favorable for unification through international cooperation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII- North Korea; Formula of Loose Form of Federation 
1. Background and History  
On August 14, 1960, the eve of the fifteenth anniversary of the end of Japanese colonial 
rule in Korea, Kim IL Sung first formally proposed to the republic of Korea the 
establishment of a confederation consisting of representatives from the DPRK and the 
ROK governments. While keeping the different political systems in North and South 
 29 
Korea, the proposed confederation would mainly regulate economic and cultural 
development in North and South Korea to promote understanding and cooperation 
between two sides.  
But Since the 1980s, North Korea has proposed more seriously Koryo Federation System 
as its unification formula. Under the formula, the two Koreas create a federation while 
maintaining two systems and two governments. With the federal government exercising 
diplomatic and military sovereignty, the two countries immediately implement a 
federation system with no transition period. However, a string is attached to the 
federation formula: abolition of the National Security Act and withdrawal of American 
forces from the Korean peninsula. 17 
In the 1990s, North Korea came to worry about possible unification by absorption by the 
South. The communist country also realized finally that unification was far from likely 
under the current inter-Korean relations.  
Loose form of federation is a unification formula that North Korea put forward for the 
first time in Prime minister summit talk. In his New Year’s address in 1991, Kim IL Sung 
proposed a similar conceptual approach, saying more power shall be given to local 
autonomous governments on a temporary basis.  
2. Concept  
                                                               
17- Kim IL Sung,  “ for the independent peaceful Reunification of Korea” New York international 
publishers, 1975, p. 30.  
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Under the formula, the two Koreas create a federation while keeping the existing two 
systems and governments intact. In addition, both the countries have diplomatic and 
military sovereignty.  
The fundamental difference between the formula and the Koryo Federation System lies in 
that the formula proposes maintenance of the situation above for a long time for phased 
development of inter-Korean relations and their ultimate unification. The formula also 
calls for permanent peace and co-prosperity through mutual cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII- Common Ground in Unification Formulas between South and 
North Korea 
First, they envision an interim stage of unification in recognition that it would be difficult 
to immediately realize unification with a phased and gradual unification formula (close to 
the South Korean formula of inter-Korean confederation).  
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Second, the two Koreas retain and exercise their right to manage internal, diplomatic and 
military affairs, while maintaining the current two systems and governments at an interim 
stage (close to the South Korean formula of inter-Korean confederation).  
Third, systematic unification is preceded by national and social integration (close to the 
South Korean formula of inter-Korean confederation). This is aimed at gearing up for 
unification through peaceful coexistence, exchanges, cooperation and recovery of 
national homogeneity unification.  
Fourth, the two Koreas can pursue unification based on mutual consultation at any time 
(close to the South Korean formula of inter-Korean confederation). Though its intention 
is not crystal-clear, the country does not seem to attach any preconditions to its 
unification formula.  
Fifth, the two Koreas organize an inter-Korean council dubbed as an inter-Korean 
confederation by the South and a loose form of federation by the North. A federation 
without the authority to manage internal, diplomatic and military matters is virtually a 
standing council, which is equivalent to an inter-Korean confederation in substance.  
 
VIIII - Historic South and North Korean Summit  
Kim Dae-Jung President of the Republic of Korea and Kim Jung-IL Chairman of the 
national Defense Commission of the Democratic people’s Republic of Korea had a 
historic meeting and summit in Pyongyang from June 13 to 15, 2000.  
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The inter-Korea summit which held in North Korea marked a key shift in the Cold War 
relations that have dominated the divided peninsula for more than 50 years. Leaders of 
North and South Korea (countries still technically at war) met for the first time and 
signed a five-point accord aimed at the restoration of economic and political ties and the 
eventual reunification of Korea. 
The heads of the North and the South, considering that the recent meeting and summit  
(the first of their kind in history of division) are events of weighty importance in 
promoting mutual understanding, developing inter-Korean relations and achieving 
peaceful reunification, declare as follows:  
1. The North and the South agreed to solve the question of the country's reunification 
independently by the concerted efforts of the Korean nation responsible for it.  
2. The North and the South, recognizing that a proposal for federation of lower stage 
advanced by the North side and a proposal for confederation put forth by the South side 
for the reunification of the country have elements in common, agreed to work for the 
reunification in this direction in the future.  
3. The North and the South agreed to settle humanitarian issues, including exchange of 
visiting groups of separated families and relatives and the issue of unconverted long-term 
prisoners, as early as possible on the occasion of August 15 this year.  
4. The North and the South agreed to promote the balanced development of the national 
economy through economic cooperation and build mutual confidence by activating 
cooperation and exchanges in all fields, social, cultural, sports, public health, 
environmental and so on.  
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5. The North and the South agreed to hold dialogues between the authorities as soon as 
possible to implement the above-mentioned agreed points in the near future.  
President Kim Dae-jung cordially invited Chairman Kim Jong- il of the DPRK National 
Defense Commission to visit Seoul and Chairman Kim Jong- il agreed to visit Seoul at an 
appropriate time in the future.  
 This summit has some historic meanings: First, the Joint Declaration is the first 
agreement signed by the top leaders of South and North Korea in the 55 years since the 
division of the nation. In view of the Korean political culture, the attitudes and thoughts 
of the top leaders are critically important. Second, the Joint Declaration confirms the 
principle that inter-Korean issues should be resolved by North and South Korea. 
Establishment of peace on the Korean peninsula, inter-Korean cooperation and national 
unification are issues that the South and the North must play principal roles in resolving 
through dialogue and negotiations. Third, there is firm agreement on the prevention of 
war and settlement of peace on the Korean peninsula. In accordance with this spirit, the 
two Koreas will try to implement measures such as the opening of direct military hotlines, 
the suspension of mutual denunciation and acts of destruction and insurrection. Fourth, 
the summit itself creates a good opportunity to put inter-Korean relations on the right 
track and hold sincere dialogue on the issue of national unification. Fifth, inter-Korean 
cooperation is needed to realize the reunion of separated families and active promotion of 
South-North cooperation in all fields is beneficial to both Koreas. The two leaders shared 
a view that reuniting separated family members should be a humanitarian issue and 
agreed that the issue should be addressed and worked out gradually in a process that takes 
into  consideration the positions of both sides. The enhancement of exchanges and 
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cooperation in all areas is compatible with promoting the development and interests of 
the entire Korean nation. Finally, the first Korean summit can also contribute to stability 
and peace in Northeast Asia. Inter-Korean cooperation will help solidify mutual trust, 
expand areas of common interests, and promote peace on and around the Korean 
peninsula. 
Although it is too early to assess whether North Korea's approach to South Korea is 
strategic, it may be safe to say that the summit represents a certain change in North 
Korea's attitude toward South Korea. The summit can be a momentum to promote and 
create the favorable climate for an end to Cold War and rapprochement on the Korean 
peninsula: First, as the North and South Korean military authorities stopped slandering 
each other right after the summit, it may help defuse the sense of mutual distrust and 
confrontation and ideological feuds. Both sides will promote closer economic exchanges 
and cooperation as well as government-to-government talks. Second, it is expected that 
more active inter-Korean economic exchanges and cooperation will be developed. While 
on-going projects such as Mt. Kumgang tourism and joint ventures in automobiles and 
electronics will be accelerated, South Korean firms will enhance their transactions  with 
North Korean counterparts. They will also seek an opportunity to take part in North 
Korean social overhead capital projects, including the construction of roads, railways and 
harbors. South and North Korea are expected to work on agreements on investment 
guarantee, avoidance of double taxation, liquidation of debts and deferred payments and 
the settlement of disputes. Third, South Korea will enhance its efforts to encourage the 
North to be responsive to the implementation of the Basic Agreement effectuated in 
February 1992. Once North and South Korea agree to do it, inter-Korean relations 
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Can be normalized as time passes. In the course of working out and implementing 
substantial steps to resolve inter-Korean issues between the two Koreas, inter-Korean 
relations are expected to be put on the right track. If and when such progress is made, 
North and South Korea would be able to remove the Cold War structure on the peninsula, 
realizing permanent peace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
X - Possible Scenario for Korean Peninsula Reunification (integration 
and peaceful unification) 
Peaceful unification posits two fundamental assumption; 1) that both government and For 
a world and especially for south and north Korea and four major powers (China, Japan, 
America and Russia) in the region peaceful unification through gradual integration, 
implementation of confidence-building measures and major threat reduction activities, 
and comprehensive political and social reconciliation between the two Korea is the 
preferred unification option. 
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public opinion in the south will undertake profound changes in attitudes and assumptions 
about each other, and 2) that a series of interim steps can be instituted that ultimately 
allow the far larger changes posited under this model. Without meeting these two 
conditions, it is virtually impossible to imagine how the two sides would get from here to 
there. But given the major attention that peaceful unification continues to receive in 
various policy pronouncements and analytic assessment, it warrants careful descr iption 
and evaluation. Peaceful unification presumes the cessation of military threat, armed 
hostilities, and ideological antagonism, ultimately enabling the creation unified Korean 
State. The process of integration between the two Koreas further assumes a political 
understanding including agreement on a permanent peace mechanism as an interim 
measure prior to formal unification. Though such an outcome clashes sharply with the 
realities of the peninsula today, both governments are familiar with its content and logic. 
The leaders of south and north first subscribed to some of these tents in the July 4 Joint 
Communiqué of 1972. Subsequent measures paralleling or extending the logic of this 
accord included the December 12, 19991 basic agreement (the most comprehensive CBS 
ever concluded between the two Koreas ) and the Joint South-North Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korea peninsula of January 20, 199218. 
The common political requirement in all such documents is that both sides must agree to 
and implement comprehensive political arrangements that would supplant the half – 
century pattern of confrontation and hostility. 
                                                               
18- The formal title of the December 1991 accord is the “South-North Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation”. It officially entered into force on February 19, 1992. The 
January 1992 denuclearization declaration forbids experimentation, manufacturing, production, acceptance, 
possession, storage, or use of nuclear weapons. It further states that neither the South nor the North will 
possess a reprocessing or enrichment plant. Source: white paper on Korean unification, 1996 “peace and 
cooperation” Ministry of National Unification, Republic of Korea.  
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Towards these ends, both states would be obligated to agree to far-reaching military 
CBMs’ ultimately enabling creation of an integrated military system between South and 
North. Peaceful unification also assumes economic integration that would build on 
presumed complementarities between the two economies. In addition, unification would 
necessitate a comprehensive redrafting of various international agreements and 
diplomatic documents.  
Assuming that peaceful negotiated occurs, the process would, at a minimum, encompass 
the following component: 
Political, the south and north would have to accept each other as full negotiating partners 
and as equal legal entities before commencing a series of negotiations that would lead to 
a mutually binding political settlement. All of the inter-Korea dialogue channels could be 
used, or an entirely new framework of communications and negotiations could be 
established. In addition, general and specific principles and procedures would have to be 
enunciated, including the peace of negotiations, the desirability of gradual integration 
between the two sides, and specific norms to govern political relations. 
Legal, the South and North would have to draft new, regulations, and agreements to 
enable negotiations on a comprehensive structure that covers all aspects of unified 
governance. 
Security, the 1953 armistice agreement signed between the united state (as a head of the 
United Nations Forces), china, and North Korea would have to replace by a permanent 
peace treaty. A mechanism for collaboration between the militaries of both systems 
would have to be enunciated before any steps toward integration could proceed. 
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Potential indicators of peaceful unification           
Many of the indicators of peaceful would be self – evident, including routinized political 
exchanges and summit meeting; such as 2000 summit adherence to already signed South- 
North accord such as the 1991 basic agreement; implementation of a mutually verifiable 
CBM regime; and unhindered construction of the light- water reactors under KEDO; and 
full compliance by North Korea and the united states with the October 1994 Agreed 
Framework. Other functional indicators would attest to a fairly high degree of 
predictability that assumes productive negotiations between the two Koreas. We can 
outline these below; 
Political indicators: Mutual recognition across political institutions , cessation of all 
political propaganda by both sides, Routinized continuation high-level exchanges 
including summit meeting, Release of all political prisoners in North and South, 
Abrogation of national security and espionage laws, Extensive exchanges between 
political parties and ability to engage political activities in the South and North. 
Social and Economic Indicators: More freedom of movement and travel within and 
between the two Koreas, as well as abroad, Cessation of government censorship, 
Removal of restrictions on dissemination of print and electronic media, ability to enroll 
freely in schools and educational institutions, Decoupling of economic exchanges form 
reciprocal political measures, Constitutional and legislative changes that allow for 
unconstrained economic activities between the South and North including the flow of 
people, goods, services, capital, and technologies , Upgrading of joint venture laws in the 
North , Full convertibility of the currencies of South and North. 
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Military and security Indicators: Unconditional North Korean participation in the four-
party talks, Cessation of diplomatic competition between the two Koreas and 
establishment of diplomatic ties between the United states and North Korea and Japan 
and North Korea, Replacement of the Armistice Agreement (1953) with a permanent 
peace treaty, Maintenance of all KEDO provisions and conditions, Full North Korean 
compliance with international Atomic Energy Agency and NPT provision, Significant 
progress in military CBMs including prenotification of military exercises, establishment 
of a military hotline, mutual observation of military exercises and other command post 
exercises, and step by step fully verifiable force reductions , Cessation of all military 
activities constructed as provocative or offensive. 
It is difficult to imagine that all of these indicators would appear before peaceful 
unification, given that many of them imply profound changes for both Korea. The two 
Koreas not only have to come to terms politically at the highest level, but mutual 
confidence and agreement must be reached at all other levels before creating a unified 
government. An additional important requirement for peaceful unification is the 
generation of strong public support. Various unification proposals such as the “National 
Common wealth” model of the early 1990s and Kim Dae Jung’s calls for realizing “co-
existence and co-prosperity”, presume interim steps that would enable mutual 
accommodation and integration prior to unification. Thus, peaceful unification would 
entail a fundamental political and strategic transformation within and between both 
governments and in the populations of South and North. 
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Conclusion  
For better or worst, for the south and north Korea resolving the state division had become 
a secondary concern due to the realistic difficulties which raised especially by the cold 
war era. In this dissertation I have reviewed the historic background of the division and 
the process of the unification debates from the period after liberation until the present 
within the situation framework of the changes in the international environment and the 
South – North relations. The changes in international environment and inter- Korean 
relations significantly affected the consolidation of division and the development of the 
unification debates, and these situational variables provide an effective framework for 
analysis.    
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As I examined we can indicate four periods for Korean unification process. 
First Period: the eight year period from liberation on august 1945 to the end of the 
Korean war in 1953 can be described as the consolidation period of the division of 
Korean peninsula. The post- liberation political situation on the Korean peninsula saw the 
United States and Soviet Union, in conflict over the establishment of a new international 
order in post-war Northeast Asia, install military government on the Korean peninsula. At 
the same time, the various domestic political parties were in a state of extreme 
ideological confrontation, acting not to build a unified nation but instead trying to gain a 
superior position in the struggle of power and for the interests of their own parties. These 
two factors, the US and Soviet policies and the ideological and strategic confrontation of 
domestic political forces, determined the fate of the Korean peninsula in the post- 
liberation period until the time of the Korean War. 
The initial American policy for Korea was wavered between a “Korea international 
trusteeship plan” 19 through cooperation with the soviet union and a plan to establish a 
separate government in south Korea even assuming a confrontation with the USSR. Yet 
with the US-Soviet Cold War framework gradually solidifying and with the US foreign 
policy makers’ gradually settling on a policy of containment of the Soviet Union, 
Washington adopted a “defensive minimal strategy” of constructing a strong anti-
Communist state in south Korea. The initial Korean peninsula policy of the soviet union, 
                                                               
19- At the Moscow Conference of December 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the then Soviet Union, Great 
Britain and the United States on the initiative of the U.S. reached an agreement to create a Joint Soviet- U.S. 
Commissions to work out the details for the establishment of a four power Trusteeship, consisting Soviet 
Union, Britain, the U.S. and China, over Korea for five years. When news of this agreement reached Korea, 
it aroused strong protest. The Korea Communists in the North and South were also initially opposed to this 
agreement. However the Korean Communists reversed their position on instruction from Moscow. Source : 
Koo Woo Nam, “ The North Korean Communist Leadership, 1945-1965: A study of factionalism and 
political consolidation, university of Alabama press, 1974, p. 31         
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in contrast, was an “ active minimal strategy” to establish first a communist state in north 
Korea based on Stalin’s “one- country socialism theory”. With Kim IL Sung’s gaining 
near- complete power in the North Korean region as planned by the Soviet military 
government, the Soviet interests eventually shifted to cover the entire peninsula, starting 
from 1946, and they shifted to an “offensive maximal strategy” that pursued the national 
expansion of the unification front. Nevertheless, the Soviet offensive maximal strategy 
later reverted to the previous active minimal mode as a result of the national anti-
trusteeship movement in South Korea, the breakdown in the First and Second Joint US-
Soviet Coordinating Commission, and Washington’s transfer of the Korea issue to the 
United Nations. 
Second period: The period after the Korean War until the 1970s was a vacuum period 
for unification debates and was characterizes by the continuation of the international Cold 
War system and the competition between the systems of North and South Korea. North 
Korea started the war to unify the peninsula through violent means, but the war only 
brought serious material damage to both North and South to such a degree that afterwards 
both countries had to devote their entire efforts to the establishment of a material 
foundation. This consisted not only of economic reconstruction but also the strengthening 
of the capabilities of the respective system of each through increased military power. In 
this competition, Pyongyang successfully surpassed the South. 
Third period: The period between 1971 to 1987 was a thawing period of the unification 
debate. Internationally this period began with an environment of détente, yet later US-
Soviet tensions increased and the situation surrounding the Korean peninsula developed 
into a confrontation between soviet expansionism and an “allied system” consisting of the 
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US, China and Japan. These changes in the international environment transformed in 
initial atmosphere of dialogue between the two countries into a confrontational and 
competitive relationship. 
The atmosphere of dialogue in the early 1970s was largely influenced by the economic 
balance between the South and North. Through the success of its economic development 
plan in the 1960s, Seoul shed its inferiority over the DPRK and, for the first time, showed 
a willingness to coexist with its Northern counterpart. South Korea’s economic success, 
however, forced Pyongyang, which was experiencing diplomatic difficulties because of 
ideological conflicts with Beijing and Moscow, to modify its South Korea strategy 
temporarily. As a result, despite the signing of the July 7 South- North Declaration in 
1972, neither South nor North Korea seriously devoted themselves to try to achieve 
unification through dialogue. 
After the middle 1970s, tensions between the North and South returned with the onset of 
a new Cold War atmosphere internationally and due to fierce military and economic 
competition domestically. Based on South Korea’s continued economic growth and 
military build-up plans in the 1980s, North Korea’s economic inferiority further increased 
and its superiority considerably diminished. 
Forth period: The period after 1988 can be called the blossoming period of the 
unification debates. During this period, the Cold War system collapsed internationally, 
the ROK initiated its North politic and North Korea’s economic difficulties and 
diplomatic isolation continued. South Korea’s system further stabilized through its 
economic growth and democratization process. North Korea became increasingly nervous 
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as a result and, engulfed by fears of South Korea’s unification through absorption, North 
Korea tried its utmost to improve its relations with the US, hoping that this might provide 
a breakthrough that would allow it to maintain its system.      
In 1998 unification debates has entered in a new chapter especially by pursuing Sun 
Shine policy by South Korea. President Kim Dae-jung suggested its policy (sun shine) 
toward North Korea, asking North Korea to open its door to South and the outside world 
and indicating that South Korea would not seek to absorb the North. Although response 
was very defensive by North Korea which it said that it would pursue its own policy of 
opening the door in its own way to the outside world and criticized South Korea's attempt 
to liberalize the North through its sunshine policy.  
The Kim Dae-jung Administration hopes to improve intra-Korean relations by promoting 
peace, reconciliation, and cooperation.  
At the present stage, it is more urgent to establish durable peace and assure the peaceful 
coexistence of the two Koreas than to push for immediate reunification. When there is an 
assurance of durable peace, the Administration plans to promote reconciliation and 
cooperation with North Korea. Main Principles of this policy are as follows:1) No armed 
provocation by North Korea will be tolerated.2) A takeover or absorption of North Korea 
will not be attempted.3) Reconciliation and cooperation will be expanded  
Therefore, It is easy to understand, why the Kim Dae-jung Administration would prefer 
the two countries to come together gradually. For a while, the  two Koreas would have 
separate governments, different currencies, a closed border and so on. This is not 
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unimaginable, but it will be hard to pull off. If migrants are determined to come south, 
they will-and short of using force, South Korea cannot stop them.  
In essence, the South's approach is contradictory. It aims to prevent collapse( to avoid 
hard landing scenario) in the North today, because having to rebuild it from scratch 
would place too great a burden on South Korea. Instead, the idea is to give the North a 
chance to implement the radical reform it needs. Yet the regime of Kim Jong I1 is 
unstable, and the political and economic liberalisation that would accompany radical 
reform is likely to lead to the very collapse the South is seeking to avoid.  
That would suit America and China. Unification is a threat to America's Asian bases. 
America is not particularly popular in the South, where nationalists accuse it of using 
their country as a training ground and a market for weapons. In a united Korea, America 
would play a diminished role. In time, a chauvinistic Korean government might even 
seek to remove all foreign troops from its soil. America might also come under pressure 
from public opinion in Japan to close its base in Okinawa, which is meant to provide 
rapid support in the event of another North Korean attack. China, for its part, would like 
to avoid an influx of Korean migrants into the border region with North Korea, where 
ethnic Koreans already number almost half the population. Besides, it neither wants to 
have American troops on its border, nor, were they to leave, would it be ready for an 
arms race with Japan.  
Because all of them want the status quo to endure, China, Japan, South Korea and 
America supply the lion's share of the aid pouring into North Korea. Japan and South 
Korea are building two nuclear power stations in return for a North Korean promise to 
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abandon its own nuclear program. China provides a large amount of oil, as well as 
250,000 tones of food a year. In addition, the United Nations has pledged to supply 
584,000 tones of food in the next 12 months, almost 90% of which will come from 
America.  
Such a narrow base of donors is bound to be unstable, especially when the recipient is as 
belligerent and unpredictable as North Korea. The country has already caused great 
international irritation by doing things like forging dollar bills on presses imported from 
Europe, allowing its diplomats to smuggle drugs and counterfeit goods, and sending 
frogmen and submarine commandos to spy on the South. But what really worries the 
donors is the evidence that the North is developing weapons of mass destruction.  
It has good reasons for wanting to do so. Despite spending more than it can afford on its 
armed forces, North Korea simply cannot keep up with America and South Korea.  
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons offer the North a line of protection. They are 
also its only means of attack if it remains bent on its national mission of liberating the 
South. Moreover, they can turn a tidy profit. The reactor deals that resulted from the 
desperate diplomacy in 1994 over the North Korean nuclear program in Yongbyon were 
worth at least $4.5 billion, more than four times the North's annual exports. Further 
worries over excavations at Kumchangri, not far from Yongbyon, caused a huge amount 
of American food aid to be pledged in exchange for an inspection of the excavations.  
Yet although South Korea cannot prepare the North for the trauma of unification, it can 
prepare itself. As a first step, it should define the principles of unification, draft 
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emergency legislation and, behind the scenes, plot the possible course of unification with 
its allies. But there are other dimensions to the preparation too.  
Finally it should be mentioned that Gradualism has to be balanced against the risk of 
reversal. A gradual approach should only be pursued if it is certain that the process 
cannot be reversed. If there is a risk of reversal in political terms, a big bang approach 
would be preferable. If there is too much gradualism, the process may equally falter 
unless there is a critical mass of institutional change, which by itself is difficult to 
determine. The main task would be to prevent military complications during a transitional 
period that would precede unification. Thereafter would come a period during which both 
countries would be integrated. Above all, care should be taken that the international 
competitiveness of the South Korean economy be preserved. 
The proposals made by both parties remain very relevant, calling as they did for contacts 
between North and South Korea, contacts between the North Korean elites and those of 
the South.  
It will be important for North and South to develop good diplomatic relations with its 
neighbors, especially China and Japan. All countries having political and other interests 
in the region must be involved in the process (China, Russia, Japan, the United States, the 
ASEAN countries). It is incumbent upon Korea to foster an international climate 
conducive to its reunification process, for which it needs the assistance and consent of the 
world community. One particular issue of concern to the world community at large is the 
nuclear status of North Korea and how it will affect the status of a reunified Korea.   
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In sum up among different scenarios, I can say gradualism and soft landing one is 
more applicable rather than hard landing one 20. so that the result of hard landing scenario 
which North Korean government would collapse or overthrow when a coup take place, it 
makes a complete breakdown of the North Korean society with all the humanitarian 
tragedies that accompany the chaos of a society out of control and a North Korean civil 
war breaks out. In this case North Korean civilians are likely to attempt to cross the 
Demilitarized Zone and come to south as well as north to China and Russia in search of 
peace, stability, and a better way of life. But if Kim Chong Il remains in power but 
recognize that his power base is too weak and that he can no longer effectively govern. In 
this case he approaches the South and seeks reunification in accordance with South 
Korea’s long term reunification policy or variation thereof.       
In this regard Soft landing scenario is try to provide an evolutionary change for 
the North Korea that will gradually bring its economy into grater interaction with the 
market economies of the region, inducing economic reforms and, through that process, 
building relationships that will eventually result in some political changes. Perhaps the 
china model is not exactly perfect, but something in the nature of the evolution that has 
taken place in china. Opinions vary on this prospect. Nobody can guarantee that it will 
happen. Now the problem for North Korea is that they are really not competitive in the 
international investment field. They don’t have the infrastructure, they don’t have the 
legal base. Even though they started this very tentatively way back in 1984 with the first 
                                                               
20 hard landing scenario would be enormously costly to the South Korea. According to to CGE models 
calibrated for 2000 indicate that the cost of unification could be on the order of $800 to $1.600 billion in 
the assumption that capital and not labor flows are the primary channel through which income convergence 
is achieved.  Source: Noland Marcus, Sherman Robinson and Ligang Liu “ the economics of Korean 
Unification” working paper Series 97-5 Washington , Institute for International Economics, 1997, p.199. 
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investment act, they can’t compete with those countries that are getting foreign 
investment in East Asia.21they don’t have competitive capacity. 
South Korea for some reasons such as; cultural propinquity and geographical closeness is 
the only country can move into this situation. In this regard it has recently somewhat 
relaxed the restriction. It has permitted some companies especially Hyundai to explore 
investments in several different fields. Daewoo is already involved in a small textile 
venture in Nampo, which is very close to the capital city of Pyongyang. It seems to me as 
an outsider that this is a very appropriate rout. It seems to me that further relaxation on 
this front is highly desirable.              
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